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In this book, Alvin Plantinga and michael Tooley debate the epistemic 
status of theistic belief. And as you might expect from philosophers of 
their calibre, the arguments laid out by both are robust and cogent. The 
book begins with opening statements from both philosophers (each 
being roughly 70 pages long), followed by two sets of two responses.
While those already familiar with Alvin Plantinga’s other work will 
not be terribly surprised by the arguments he makes in his opening 
statement, they are, nevertheless, still extremely relevant and are 
presented in perhaps their clearest form. In his opening statement 
(and after some preliminary comments regarding theism in general), 
Plantinga offers a three-fold argument against philosophical naturalism 
(the thought being that naturalism is the only real alternative to theism, 
such that the defeat of naturalism would lend credence to theism). First, 
Plantinga argues that naturalism cannot rightly account for the notion 
of proper function, which in turn means that naturalism cannot account 
for ‘malfunction or dysfunction ... health or sickness, sanity or madness’; 
indeed, by Plantinga’s lights, in not being able to account for proper 
function, naturalism cannot account for knowledge (p.  1). Secondly, 
Plantinga argues that naturalism is self-defeating, that ‘the naturalist is 
committed to the sort of deep and debilitating skepticism according to 
which he can’t trust his cognitive faculties to furnish him with mainly true 
beliefs; he has a defeater for whatever he believes, including naturalism 
itself ’ (p. 1). Thirdly and finally, Plantinga argues that naturalism (insofar 
as it is committed to materialism regarding human beings) cannot 
account for belief, that materialist forms of naturalism are committed to 
eliminativism regarding belief, that ‘if naturalism is true, no one believes 
anything’ (p. 19).
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michael Tooley, in his opening statement, argues that the belief in the 
existence of God is not epistemically justified because various ‘facts about 
the evils found in the world’ make the existence of God (very) unlikely 
(p. 70). To this end, michael Tooley begins by making some preliminary 
comments regarding (a) the relevant concept of God under consideration, 
(b) that God’s relation to the prevailing, historical religions of Christianity, 
Islam, and Judaism, (c) how identifying the relevant concept of God with 
the God of any those three religions affects the argument from evil, and 
(d) the nature of debate at hand, whether it should be framed in terms 
of knowledge or simply epistemic justification (Tooley opts for the latter). 
once this has been done, Tooley begins to build his case for atheism. He 
starts by briefly surveying a  number of arguments for atheism, which 
he groups into a priori arguments, a posteriori arguments that do not 
involve moral claims, and a posteriori arguments that do involve moral 
claims. And in so doing, Tooley argues (a) that atheism (not theism or 
agnosticism) is the default position in the debate, (b) that it is unlikely 
that there are immaterial minds, and finally (c) that the argument from 
evil is the ‘most forceful’ argument in favour of atheism (p. 71). As such, 
the argument from evil becomes Tooley’s main focus in the latter half of 
his opening statement. That said, however, Tooley acquiesces that ‘[s]
etting out the argument [from evil] properly is  ... rather more difficult 
than has generally been appreciated’; as such, the bulk of his work at this 
point is devoted to surveying various formulations of the argument from 
evil (‘abstract versus concrete formulations  ... incompatibility versus 
evidential formulations; subjective versus objective formulations; and ... 
axiological versus deontological formulations’) and subsequently fully 
elucidating and defending his favoured model (p. 71).
In Chapter 3, ‘reply to Tooley’s opening statement’, Plantinga’s 
main target is, of course, Tooley’s favoured formulation of the argument 
from evil. (There are, no doubt, several other important arguments 
that Plantinga makes in his first reply. For example, it seems to me 
that Plantinga does an excellent job countering Tooley’s claim that 
atheism is the default position. That said, however, such arguments 
are more ancillary, and I  will not consider them here.) According to 
Plantinga, ‘Tooley’s statement of the argument gives us believers in God 
a wonderful target; if we can show that this formulation of the argument 
doesn’t succeed, it seems unlikely, for the moment, at any rate, that any 
formulation will’ (p.  153). Thankfully for ‘us believers’ Plantinga not 
only argues that Tooley’s probabilistic argument from evil does indeed 
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fail, but he argues that even if it didn’t, theism ‘might still be more likely 
than not on our total evidence’ (p.  152). After all, as Plantinga points 
out, ‘[m]ost Christian thinkers have held that there are other sources 
of justification for belief in God; religious experience, for example, or 
something like [John] Calvin’s Sensus divinitatis, or Thomas Aquinas’s 
internal instigation of the Holy spirit’ and these other sources of 
justification might very well trump any justification to the contrary from 
Tooley’s argument from evil (p. 153).
In Chapter 4, ‘reply to Plantinga’s opening statement’, michael 
Tooley straightforwardly responds to each of Plantinga’s arguments 
against naturalism. He begins by arguing that health, sickness, or even 
knowledge cannot, contra Plantinga, be appropriately analyzed in terms 
of proper function; if this is right, then Plantinga’s claim that naturalism 
cannot account for such concepts because it cannot account for proper 
function does not get off the ground. Next, Tooley addresses Plantinga’s 
third argument against naturalism, that naturalism (insofar as it is 
committed to materialism regarding human beings) cannot account 
for belief. Given a causal theory of propositional content, Tooley argues 
naturalism (of the relevant sort) can indeed account for belief. And what 
is more, if such a causal theory of content is indeed true, Tooley argues, 
it is no longer clear that naturalism is vulnerable to the aforementioned 
‘deep and debilitating skepticism according to which he can’t trust his 
cognitive faculties to furnish him with mainly true beliefs’, the second 
objection to naturalism in Plantinga’s opening statement.
The book concludes with Plantinga and Tooley giving brief (roughly 
15 pages), final responses to the initial responses. The main thrust of 
Plantinga’s closing statement (entitled ‘Can robots Think?’) argues 
that ‘Tooley merely assumes that the content of belief is fixed by causal 
relations, and, furthermore, so fixed that most beliefs will be true’ (p. 232 
- emphasis Plantinga’s). The main thrust of Tooley’s closing statement, in 
contrast, focuses on (a) shoring up his arguments for atheism being the 
default position in the debate, (b) defending his argument from evil, (c) 
questioning the existence (and the epistemic value) of non-inferential 
justification in favour of the existence of God, and (d) noting that even 
if all of Plantinga’s arguments against naturalism are successful that does 
not necessarily lead us to theism (e.g. it may lead us to some form of 
supernaturalism). In the end, neither Plantinga nor Tooley are compelled 
to yield, both feel as though their arguments remain cogent and sound.
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I highly commend Knowledge of God. While I am, no doubt, inclined 
to side with Plantinga in the end, both Plantinga and Tooley do an 
amazing job. The arguments they both lay out are philosophically rich, 
robust, and truly seminal. The main shortcoming of the book, as I see it, 
is a shortcoming of these sorts of debates in general. While the arguments 
levelled in this book are of a high quality and are extremely useful, the 
nature of the debate is such that it spans broad, established disciplines 
with their own worlds of literature. In debating the epistemic status of 
theistic belief, Plantinga and Tooley occasionally make highly contested 
claims about morality, theology, the nature of logic, epistemology, the 
philosophy of mind, etc.  – for example, regarding Plantinga’s second 
objection to naturalism in his opening statement, Tooley notes ‘If 
[Plantinga] is right, then virtually all of philosophy of mind of the past 
half-century or so has been radically off-track.’ – and that may be the 
way it has to be; however, it is, nevertheless, occasionally frustrating and 
dissatisfying (p. 190). regardless, Knowledge of God is an excellent book, 
which I would wholeheartedly recommend to anyone with the interest 
and technical familiarity and certainly to any graduate students studying 
philosophy of religion.
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Across its history, Christianity and other religions have demonstrated 
a  consistent capacity to respond to ongoing criticism. Those critics, 
whether historical or contemporary, have used various tactics to try 
to undermine religion. Despite the tenacity and ingenuity of these 
criticisms, especially those invested in the modern sciences, a once-and-
for-all challenge to religion is unforthcoming. responding to this fact, 
robert A. Hinde emphasises that ‘something more than a sledgehammer, 
however skilfully it is wielded, is needed. We need to seek a  scientific 
understanding of religion’s extraordinary resilience’ (p.  viii). The aim 
of this book is, then, to provide that understanding of religion, thereby 
enabling, if only in part, the formation of a  ‘a  happier world’ (p.  ix). 
